A monosexual configuration of sexuality assumes that sexual desire is directed at either men or women. Bisexuality resists a choice between oppositional categories and is often theorised as having a transgressive potential to destabilise binary logic, not only in relation to sexuality but also to gender. There is, however, a lack of empirical work exploring how this potential might be realised in the accounts of bisexual individuals. Drawing on interviews with South African bisexual women, we use a narrative-discursive lens to (...) examine the discursive resources employed by participants to trouble or resist hetero-gendered norms. Our findings demonstrate how resistance to the gender binary hinges on citational politics that are fundamentally gendered and linked to sexuality. Instead of entirely destabilising hetero-gendered norms, participants draw on gendered scripts that simultaneously expand norms to accommodate their sexual difference and, through processes of othering, function to reiterate hetero-gendered norms. While complete subversion of gender binaries is not possible in participants’ discursive contexts, what does occur is a ‘slow bending’ of norms. Theorising bisexuality as transgressing oppositional categories closes off opportunities to interrogate the pervasive influence of gender binaries in contexts that remain marked by pervasive heteronormativity and heterosexism. Significantly, it also obscures more modest improvisations of gender scripts that hold potential for destabilising gender binaries. (shrink)

Background: To place a dependent with severe dementia in a nursing home is a painful and difficult decision to make. In collectivistic oriented societies or families, children tend to be socialised to care for ageing parents and to experience guilt and shame if they violate this principle. Leaving the care to professional caregivers does not conform with the cultural expectations of many ethnic groups and becomes a sign of the family’s moral failure. Research design: Qualitative design with individual in-depth interviews (...) with nurses, family members and dementia care coordinators in Norway, Montenegro, Serbia and South Africa. Braun and Clarke’s six analytic phases were used. Ethical considerations: The project was approved by the Regional Committee for Research, South-Eastern Norway; the Norwegian Centre for Research Data; the Ethics Committee; University of Limpopo, MEDUNSA Campus, South Africa; and by the local heads of the respective nursing homes or home care services. Interviewees were informed orally and in writing and signed an informed consent form. Findings: Healthcare professionals tend to be contacted only when the situation becomes unmanageable. Interviewees talked about feelings of obligation, shame and stigma in their societies regarding dementia, particularly in connection with institutionalisation of family members. Many lacked support during the decision-making process and were in a squeeze between their own needs and the patients’ need of professional care, and the feeling of duty and worry about being stigmatised by their surroundings. This conflict may be a source of pre-decision regret. Conclusion: Family caregivers need help to understand the behaviours of persons with dementia and how to access the formal and informal services available. Thus, they may provide effective support to patients and family carers alike. Supportive interventions for caregivers need to be tailored to meet the individual needs of both the caregiver and the persons with dementia. (shrink)

This essay examines the early reception of Scheler’s anthropological thought in Spain. The article traces the two main ways of reception of Scheler’s work in the School of Madrid and the School of Barcelona. I argue that, on the one hand, the Spanish translations of the works of the early phenomenologists – Scheler was a central figure among them – contributed to the diffusion of Scheler’s thought; and that, on the other hand, the Spanish authors subjected Scheler’s thought to a (...) critical assimilation and further developments. Scheler influenced the Spanish philosophy of the human affectivity, in which the capacity to feel, the values and love as a kernel of the human being occupy an exceptional position. This reception shows the originality of Spanish authors that incorporate Scheler’s ideas to their anthropological interest and develop these ideas in the direction of their own phenomenological anthropology. (shrink)

Many older gay men experience diminished psychological well‐being (PWB) due to unique circumstances including discrimination, living with HIV, and aging through the HIV/AIDS crisis. However, there remains ambiguity as to how older gay men define and understand PWB. Our team interviewed and analyzed the accounts of 26 older (50+) self‐identifying English‐speaking men living in southwestern British Columbia, Canada. We drew on tenets of constructivist grounded theory and intersectionality to account for unique contextual considerations and power relations. Semi‐structured Zoom interviews were (...) conducted from August‐October 2022. Interview transcripts were compared to generate high‐order conceptual findings underpinned by processes understood as central to PWB. Three PWB temporal processes highlighted interlocking social and contextual circumstances intersecting with power and maturation: (1) being emotionally balanced, (2) living gratitude (3) and fully embracing self‐acceptance. Being emotionally balanced supported the affective and sustainable state of contentment, living gratitude drew from the wisdom of accrued experiences to cultivate a positive affective state inclusive to recognising social location privileges, whilst fully embracing self‐acceptance redressed the harms of anti‐gay discourses that men endured throughout their lives. The knowledge is relevant to service and resource development to deliver tailored PWB supports to older gay men. (shrink)

Continuing medico-technical progress has led toan increasing medicalisation of pregnancy andchildbirth. One of the most common technologiesin this context is ultrasound. Based on someidentified `pro-technology feminist theories',notably the postmodernist feminist discourse,the technology of ultrasound is analysedfocusing mainly on social and political ratherthan clinical issues. As empirical researchsuggests, ultrasound is welcomed by themajority of women. The analysis, however, showsthat attitudes and decisions of women areinfluenced by broader social aspects. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the visualtechnology of ultrasound, in addition to otherreproductive technology (...) in maternity care, islinked to the `personification' of the foetusand has therefore contributed to a new image ofthe foetus. The exploration of these issueschallenges some arguments of feministdiscourse. It draws attention to possibleadverse implications of the technology forwomen's reproductive freedom and indicates theimportance of the topic for politicaldiscussions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wandering the Magnetosphere*Ingrid Koenig (bio)Navigation notes: These emergent drawings–excerpts from a visual essay–take up the complex network of impacts across physical forces entangled with bio-geo-political time. A key element for this work is a living cosmography to depict movement across time, and to visualize wandering on a planet, in the magnetosphere, and between the internal energy of Earth and the solar energy of the cosmos. Physicists say there (...) are no things, there are only relations between things.Q: Hello ancient stone - may I unfold you like a book? Do you carry a message from deep time? A: Yes, what you’re holding is not a thing, but a process. Click for larger view View full resolutionDrawing from Svalbard, Day 17 expedition, 2019[End Page 97]Drifting on a rocky planet, between the internal energy of Earth and the solar energy of the cosmos–we live within a “cosmo-tectonic circulation” —Jerome Gaillardet, geo-chemist. Click for larger view View full resolutionGeocosmic Logic[End Page 98] Click for larger view View full resolutionHow Entropy is Time (detail) Click for larger view View full resolutionMagnetic Story[End Page 99] Click for larger view View full resolutionMessage From Deep Time 3 Click for larger view View full resolutionMessage From Deep Time 1[End Page 100] Click for larger view View full resolutionLooping Matters 1 (Litli-Hrutur, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionLooping Matters 2[End Page 101] Click for larger view View full resolutionMother Rock Waves (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionMother Rock in Time[End Page 102] Click for larger view View full resolutionVolcanic Logic (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionSonic Lava (Miradalir Valley, Iceland)[End Page 103] Click for larger view View full resolutionWaves Across Time (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionDisorientations[End Page 104] Click for larger view View full resolutionMessage From Deep Time 2 Click for larger view View full resolutionGravitational Thought[End Page 105] Click for larger view View full resolutionMagnetic Thought (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionDistance Ladder Collapse[End Page 106] Click for larger view View full resolutionMattering Logic 3 Click for larger view View full resolutionMattering Logic 4[End Page 107] Click for larger view View full resolutionHow We Make Time into Space Click for larger view View full resolutionHow Entropy is Time (detail 2–Svalbard)[End Page 108]Ingrid Koenig Ingrid Koenig is Associate Professor at Emily Carr University of Art + Design, Vancouver, Canada. She was the inaugural Artist in Residence (2011 to 2021) at TRIUMF, Canada’s particle accelerator center, and co-organizes processes of collaboration between artists and physicists in a project called Leaning Out of Windows. Her studio and research practices traverse the fields of physics, social history, feminist theory, and narratives of science. Her drawings explore the complex phenomena of physics and involve intuitive responses to specific sites through fieldwork in Canada’s Rocky Mountains, Germany, Iceland, Arctic Circle art + science expeditions, and through collaborations with physicists. She has received grants from the Canada Council for the Arts, the Goethe Institute, and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. She co-edited the recently published book, Leaning Out of Windows: An Art and Physics Collaboration (Figure 1 Publishing, 2023).Footnotes* Excerpts from Wandering the Magnetosphere–drawings by Ingrid Koenig, 2019 to 2023, and ongoingCopyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press and SubStance, Inc... (shrink)

In the past decade, scholars such as Samuel Freeman, Martin O’Neill, Alan Thomas and others have argued that no matter how widely Rawls’s theory of justice (TJ) was understood as a defence of the welfare state (WS), the socio-economic system Rawls defends and always defended is property-owing democracy (POD). In this article I present the argument that Rawls did not defend POD in TJ. However, while the claim that it was POD the socio-economic system implied by the principle of difference (...) generated heated reactions by defenders of the WS, the argument I raise differs from most of them. In the article I maintain that, for Rawls, principles of justice underdetermine the choice of social systems, and that although this is true of both principles, it is especially true of the difference principle, whose ability to arbitrate between different social and economic policies is limited. I show how the attempt to uniquely determine the set of social and economic policies authorized by the difference principle clashes with what Rawls explicitly states in TJ and contrasts with central aspects of his sociological and political conception of socio-economic decision-making. Although my aim is to show that the difference principle itself does not discriminate among socio-economic systems, this does not preclude that additional reasons can help in narrowing the range of socio-economic systems allowed. With reference to the ideal of social union that Rawls expounds in the third part of TJ, I argue that TJ does, in fact, offer additional reasons to appraise the WS as preferable to POD. I maintain that the centrality Rawls attributes to the social unity of a just society provides the basis for an understanding of Rawls’s position towards POD after TJ. (shrink)

Apresenta uma análise preliminar das manifestações dos autores das Ciências Sociais e Humanas dentro do campo da Biblioteconomia e da Ciência da Informação (B & C.I.), por meio do método bibliométrico e análise de citação. Com o objetivo de descortinar quais teóricos são convocados para a construção do conhecimento na produção científica dos campos supracitados, realizou-se uma pesquisa exploratória com vistas ao levantamento dos autores das Ciências Sociais e Humanas e, posteriormente, a verificação da ocorrência deles na produção indexada pela (...) Base de Dados em Ciência da Informação (BRAPCI). Foram identificados 180 autores, dos quais 91 apareceram pelo menos uma vez nas buscas empreendidas pelos nomes e sobrenomes desses autores das Ciências Sociais e Humanas. O resultado desta pesquisa demonstrou os dois autores mais citados, Michel Foucault e Pierre Bourdieu, bem como a presença de diversos autores das Ciências Sociais e Humanas na construção do conhecimento da Biblioteconomia e da Ciência da Informação, o que contribui para o fortalecimento e a consolidação de ambas. (shrink)

My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. In contrast to views that attempt to (...) fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

Twenty-four children (aged 5 months to 18 years) who were admitted to a university hospital were observed for a total of 135 hours with the aim of describing their degree of participation in decisions concerning their own care. Grading of their participation was made by using a 5-point scale. An assessment was also made of what was considered as optimal participation in each situation. The results indicate that children are not always allowed to participate in decision making to the extent (...) that is considered optimal. In no case was it judged that a child participated in or was forced to make a decision that was too difficult for the child. The interactions between children, parents and staff were also described in connection with discussions and decision-making processes. This showed that parents do not always support their children in difficult situations and that health care staff often inform children about what is going to happen without presenting alternatives or asking for their views. Staff may, however, find themselves facing an ethical conflict in deciding between supporting a child’s view or following hospital routine. It is of great importance that children are looked upon as potentially autonomous individuals and that staff members realize that one of their core duties is to facilitate children’s participation in decision making concerning their health care. (shrink)

It now seems technically feasible to culture human embryos beyond the “fourteen‐day limit,” which has the potential to increase scientific understanding of human development and perhaps improve infertility treatments. The fourteen‐day limit was adopted as a compromise but subsequently has been considered an ethical line. Does it remain relevant in light of technological advances permitting embryo maturation beyond it? Should it be changed and, if so, how and why? What justifications would be necessary to expand the limit, particularly given that (...) doing so would violate some people's moral commitments regarding human embryos? Robust stakeholder engagement preceded adoption of the fourteen‐day limit and should arguably be part of efforts to reassess it. Such engagement could also consider the need for enhanced oversight of human embryo research. In the meantime, developing and implementing reliable oversight systems should help foster high‐quality research and public confidence in it. (shrink)

Abstract:This article employs the concept of “transformative experience” to develop a radical version of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which engaging with literary perspectives might lead the reader to experience not only an epistemic but also a personal transformation. It is argued that the reader’s imaginative and empathic abilities when subjected to the aesthetic norms that govern a literary work can mobilize other aspects of their psychology, eliciting in this way a change in their core values and, consequently, in the way (...) in which they engage with the world. After introducing the topic (section 1), the article discusses the scope of literary perspectives in terms of the character’s subjective experiences (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of the depth of literary perspectives in terms of the degree of involvement of the reader’s imaginative and empathic abilities (section 3). It proceeds to examine how the interplay between the scope and depth in the reader’s engagement with a literary perspective can explain their epistemic and personal transformation (section 4). In the final part, the article analyzes how the personal transformation changes the reader’s value system (section 5). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:You Can't Say "No" to That!(A "Difficult Patient" Story)Ingrid BergAs a sequela of COVID-19, my rural Wisconsin hospital has been jam-packed for months with patients for whom we routinely provide care and many for whom we do not. An exodus of health care workers and other constraints have made the transfer of critically ill patients very difficult. In this disquieting "new-normal" of our work life, we routinely must (...) call bigger cities throughout our state to find beds for complex patients.So, it was not surprising when a young patient, an IV drug user in sepsis from a heart infection, was admitted to me in the middle of the night. In less disheartening times, before the pandemic, this patient would have been transferred promptly to the big-city hospital. Now, though, the possibility of finding an open bed is next to impossible. Resigned, I placed admission orders, continued antibiotics and fluids, and crossed my fingers. Then the unexpected happened: a bed opened up, and we could send her at once!The patient had a harsh heart murmur. It was likely that a "vegetation" was clinging to the valve, between the right upper and lower chambers of her heart. A vegetation is a clump of debris, such as platelets, clotting proteins, and bacteria that is a menace to the body. Her chest imaging looked like her infection had already spread to her lungs.A definitive diagnosis for endocarditis requires a special ultrasound with a probe that goes down through the esophagus, a procedure performed by cardiologists. It's a serious infection, one that requires weeks of IV antibiotics and is best monitored by infectious disease specialists. Sometimes, cardiothoracic surgeons are called upon to strip away the infection at the site, depending on how badly the valve has been slayed or the size of the vegetation. My only recommendation for a young, otherwise healthy patient in this scenario, is transfer.All of these reasons for transfer were lolling around in my tired head when the night-time [End Page 14] nursing supervisor approached me and said, "We have a problem." When the patient was updated about the transfer, she balked: "She says she is tired and refusing to go," the supervisor began. "She doesn't feel like getting into an ambulance in the middle of the night and she doesn't care if her condition is life-threatening. She knows we can't force her to go and she will only talk about it again in the morning."The cartoon version of myself at that moment had bugged-out eyes, a dropped jaw, fists tight and clenched at my sides, and steam coming out of my head. I can look past a patient's self-neglect, poor medication adherence, abysmal communication, alcohol and drug addiction, and other crimes. But saying no to a bed at a tertiary care facility? Unacceptable!I marched down the quiet hallway and into her room. She was lying on her side, facing the door, one IV in a thin arm. I was confident I could reason with her once I explained the scarcity of beds and the medical necessity of transfer. But she was having none of it. I was calm until I could no longer maintain my cool: "You can't give up this bed!""Maybe in the morning," she insisted, yawning. "But not now. I am tired and want to rest!""But there might not be a bed in the morning," I countered. "And your infection can be life-threatening." (This is true, but we both knew she wasn't dying at this very moment.)"I am not going anywhere!" She raised her voice and then closed her eyes.And she was right. I had no choice but to keep her. I could not kick her out of the hospital because she was making a poor choice, and I was frustrated for having to manage the fallout of that decision. Giving her antibiotics and fluid boluses to bolster her blood pressure was certainly within my scope of practice. And fretting. Fretting is always within my scope of practice; not that my scope of practice matters when all the big... (shrink)

This article analyses the general ethical milieu in a nursing home for elderly residents and provides a decision-making model for analysing the ethical situations that arise. It considers what it means for the residents to live together and for the staff to be in ethically problematic situations when caring for residents. An interpretative phenomenological approach and Sandman’s ethical model proved useful for this purpose. Systematic observations were carried out and interpretation of the general ethical milieu was summarized as ‘being in (...) the same world without meeting’. Two themes and four subthemes emerged from the analysis. Three different ethical problems were analysed. The outcome of using the decision-making model highlighted the discrepancy between the solutions used and well-founded solutions to these problems. An important conclusion that emerged from this study was the need for a structured tool for reflection. (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that non-well-founded sets can be defined constructively by formalizing Hallnäs' limit definition of these within Martin-Löf's theory of types. A system is a type W together with an assignment of ᾱ ∈ U and α̃ ∈ ᾱ → W to each α ∈ W. We show that for any system W we can define an equivalence relation = w such that α = w β ∈ U and = w is the maximal bisimulation. Aczel's proof (...) that CZF can be interpreted in the type V of iterative sets shows that if the system W satisfies an additional condition (*), then we can interpret CZF minus the set induction scheme in W. W is then extended to a complete system W * by taking limits of approximation chains. We show that in W * the antifoundation axiom AFA holds as well as the axioms of CFZ -. (shrink)

How can we understand God's work in a world permeated with evil? Narrating her own wrestling with evil as well as engaging in biblical and philosophical analysis, biblical scholar Ingrid Faro explores the many dimensions to evil in a way that is soberly honest, biblically engaged, and theologically nuanced.

Christian Jakob Kraus (1753–1807), political economist and Professor of Practical Philosophy at the University of Königsberg, has long been neglected by historians, dismissed as a translator, a teacher, and a derivative disciple of Adam Smith. This article posits sociability as a useful category for understanding Kraus’s life, thought, and legacy. It aims to thereby reposition him as a meaningful figure in the late German Enlightenment. First, Kraus is presented as a natural Einsiedler who, surrounded by the commercially vibrant Königsberg, comes (...) to champion a methodology foregrounding praxis, lived experience, and the application of ideas for communal benefit. This ‘sociable’ approach to knowledge is contextualised within broader critiques of scholarly esotericism across Germany. Second, his work is treated as a case study elucidating the interdependence of individualism and sociability in the wider European Enlightenment. I argue that Kraus expressed a ‘sociable individualism,’ drawing upon Smith and Immanuel Kant, which harmonised autonomy and community. (shrink)

Research on gender and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) beyond women’s biological susceptibility is limited. A gender and equity lens in AMR research is necessary to promote gender equality and support the effectiveness, uptake, and sustainability of real-world AMR solutions. We argue that it is an ethical and social justice imperative to include gender and related intersectional issues in AMR research and implementation. An intersectional exploration of the interplay between people’s diverse identities and experiences, including their gender, socio-economic status, race, disability, age, (...) and sexuality, may help us understand how these factors reinforce AMR risk and vulnerability and ensure that interventions to reduce the risk of AMR do not impact unevenly. This paper reports on the findings of a systematic scoping review on the interlinkages between AMR, gender and other socio-behavioural characteristics to identify priority knowledge gaps in human and animal health in LMICs. The review focused on peer-reviewed and grey literature published between 2017 and 2022. Three overarching themes were gendered division of caregiving roles and responsibilities, gender power relations in decision-making, and interactions between gender norms and health-seeking behaviours. Research that fails to account for gender and its intersections with other lines of disadvantage, such as race, class and ability, risks being irrelevant and will have little impact on the continued and dangerous spread of AMR. We provide recommendations for integrating an intersectional gender lens in AMR research, policy and practice. (shrink)

Human embryos produced in labs since the 1970s have generated layers of uncertainty for law and policy: ontological, moral, and administrative. Ontologically, these lab-made entities fall into a gray zone between life and not-yet-life. Should in vitro embryos be treated as inanimate matter, like abandoned postsurgical tissue, or as private property? Morally, should they exist largely outside of state control in the zone of free reproductive choice or should they be regarded as autonomous human lives and thus entitled to constitutional (...) protection like full-fledged citizens? Administratively, if they deserve protection, what institutional and policy mechanisms are best suited to carrying out the necessary oversight? Using a method termed comparative problematization, this article traces divergent answers to these questions produced in three countries—the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany—across the last twenty-five years. Comparison reveals distinct bioconstitutional foundations that give rise to systematically different understandings of each state’s responsibilities toward human life and hence its particular treatment of claims on behalf of embryonic lives. (shrink)

Two theme–setting quotations introduce this essay—that of Yeats's falcon, deaf to the falconer's call, adrift in space above the blood–dimmed tide, counterpoised to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's call to abandon old nationalistic prejudices and build the earth. With primary references to the thought of Teilhard, along with, among others, to Ewert Cousins, Andrew M. Greeley, Karl Jaspers, Marshall McLuhan, Ilya Prigogine, Karl Rahner, Leonard Swidler, David Tracy, and Alfred North Whitehead, I argue that the most crucial intellectual paradigm shift of (...) the twenty–first century will challenge humanity to take the turn from uncritical attachment to rigid absolutism or atomistic fragmentation toward a sense of open–ended, off–centered centeredness and fluid connections—from a static to a dynamic model of reality. Central to my argument is the Teilhardian reinterpretation of the Christian metaphors of creation, fall, incarnation, salvation, and the eschaton in the evolutionary terms of the emergence of cosmic consciousness from the chrysalis of the world of the past—from chaos to order, from biosphere via noosphere to theosphere. Facilitated by the exponential growth of populations, collaborative research, science, technology, and global communication (most dramatically manifested by the Internet), this emergent understanding of what it means to be human can, first, foster the awareness that in humanity evolution has become conscious of itself, and then, gradually, precipitate the formation of “the global village” (the mystical body of Christ), as respectful dialogue replaces diatribe and the dualistic pugilism of Samuel Huntington's “Clash of Civilizations” is gradually transformed into a nonadversarial mentality that values shared humanity and a common purpose. Thus, eons hence, empowered by love–energy, the transmutation of the human into the ultra–human can take the ultimate quantum leap into a yet higher dimension where spirit/energy is no longer in need of flesh/mass, and Earth can be safely left behind. (shrink)

The view that linguistic questions were not central to the philosophical tradition of German Idealism has recently begun to be challenged, but a number of central texts still remain largely unknown or untranslated. Surber’s book increases our understanding of the significant role of linguistics in the German Idealist tradition, while also challenging traditional conceptions of Fichte’s role within this tradition.

This study investigated attitudes toward the use of deception in negotiation, with particular attention to the distinction between deception regarding the informational elements of the interaction (e.g., lying about or misrepresenting needs or preferences) and deception about emotional elements (e.g., misrepresenting one's emotional state). We examined how individuals judge the relative ethical appropriateness of these alternative forms of deception, and how these judgments relate to negotiator performance and long-run reputation. Individuals viewed emotionally misleading tactics as more ethically appropriate to use (...) in negotiation than informational deception. Approval of deception predicted negotiator performance in a negotiation simulation and also general reputation as a negotiator, but the nature of these relationships depended on the kind of deception involved. (shrink)

This commentary focuses upon the ‘fetishism of persons’ in Marx which Balibar claims both mirrors and animates the better-known fetishism of things. Revisiting the chapter on exchange in which Balibar grounds his thesis, the essay attends to the theatrical metaphors by which Marx presents legal personhood as a pantomime of commodity fetishism. The essay demonstrates how the movable immobility of the commodity comes to life in its inverse, the mobile and immovable figure of the legal person; it then claims that (...) this inversion positions legal persons as animate props for property. But if legal persons, the essay asks, merely personify economic relations, by what means are they sufficiently distanced from commodities to be able to become their reflex and puppet? In other words, what vestibule keeps personal liberty’s analogy with economic relations from collapsing into identity? A significant historical answer, the essay asserts, is transatlantic chattel slavery—not only because this institution is both ideological foil to, and material basis for, liberal capital, but also because the slave herself, as animate property, undoes the distinction between persons and commodities. The essay concludes by insisting upon the significance of this neglected figure in philosophies of the transindividual, while also taking first steps toward a transindividual analysis of slavery. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer (...) an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal. (shrink)

Abstract.Klaus Günther's (1988) book developed the distinction between two kinds of discourse, the foundation discourse and the application discourse. In an article (Günther 1989a) following the publication of the book, he used this basic distinction as the starting point for a criticism of the special case‐thesis as defended by Robert Alexy (1978, 32ff., 263ff.; Alexy 1989, 16ff., 213ff.). The aim of this article is to criticize this criticism in its turn and to show that the special case‐thesis does not need (...) the reformulation which Günther proposes. It should be clear from the outset that this concerns an internal discussion in the field of discourse theory; certain discourse‐theoretical premises are taken for granted. In order to understand Giinther's criticism I will first give a brief account of the distinction he has made. (shrink)

The category of “former friend” is familiar, yet the nature of this relationship type remains underexplored. Aristotle, for example, poses but does not answer the question of what constitute appropriate relations between former friends. To elucidate post-friendship expectations, I promote an account of friendship according to which some of our most significant friendships participate in a type of intimacy characterized by having normative standing to interpret each other in a constitutive manner, which I call the “co-interpretation view” of friendship. Unchecked (...) powers of co-interpretation, however, invite and allow for violations of each friend’s personhood, so I draw on Kantian resources to guide the co-interpretation view and render it more plausible. These Kantian resources help to establish relevant expectations for co-interpretation between friends. This positions me to provide an account of appropriate expectations between former friends, which I analyze in three types of post-friendship circumstance: when the friendship has faded but the parties still share a general outlook; when the friendship has become damaging for the friends but not due to viciousness; and, when the friendship ruptures due to vicious behaviors. (shrink)

Background: Studies from Western countries show that doctors working in neonatal intensive care units find withdrawal of treatment to be their most difficult ethical dilemma. There is less knowledge of how this is experienced in other economic, cultural, religious and educational contexts.Objectives: To explore and describe how Indian doctors experience ethical dilemmas concerning the withdrawal of treatment among critically sick and/or premature neonates.Method: Qualitative data from interviews was analysed according to Giorgi's phenomenological approach. The subjects were 14 doctors with various (...) levels of neonatal experience, recruited from two state‐owned NICUs in India. Main outcome measures: description reflecting the nature of ethical dilemmas and how they are experienced.Results: All doctors reported situations where the question of withdrawal of treatment was experienced as the worst part of their job. They felt that they lacked training in how to handle such dilemmas, and some had never talked about ethics before. They were especially concerned about non‐medical considerations that do not feature in current treatment guidelines. In describing their personal experiences, the informants mentioned their sense of responsibility in situations where they were aware that their decisions would influence a family's economy and reputation, availability of food and education for siblings, other children's access to equipment in the unit, and the use of resources in an underprivileged population. Sometimes lack of resources, usually ventilators, forced them to make decisions about which babies should get the chance to live. Other reported dilemmas included difficulties co‐operating with uneducated and poor parents.Conclusion: While Western doctors seem to focus on the rights and problems of the individual child, Indian doctors tend to refer to consequences for other children, for parents and society. There is a need for further research in this field, and for the development of guidelines on how to cope with differences in resources, and how to handle different patient groups’ cultural and religious concerns. (shrink)

This article is based on an empirical study regarding ethical challenges in intercultural nursing. The focus is on autonomy and disclosure. Autonomy is a human capacity that has become an important ethical principle in nursing. Although the relationship between autonomy and patients’ possibly harmful choices is discussed, the focus is on ‘forced’ autonomy. Nurses seem to equate respect with autonomy; it seems to be hard to cope with the fact that there are patients who voluntarily undergo treatment but who actively (...) participate neither in the treatment offered nor in making choices regarding that treatment. Nurses’ demand for patients to be autonomous may in some cases jeopardize the respect, integrity and human worth that the ethical principle of autonomy is meant to ensure. Even though respect for a person’s autonomy is also respect for the person, one’s respect for the person in question should not depend on his or her capacity or aptitude to act autonomously. Is autonomy necessarily a universal ethical principle? This article negates this question and, through the issues of culture, individualism versus collectivism, first- and second- order autonomy, communication and the use of family interpreters, and respect, an attempt is made to explain why. (shrink)